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Abstract
This paper describes a model and resulting simulations to assess the appropriate age
structure of intervention in childhood on the theme: should we intervene early or late?
We use asset theory approaches to construct a general model of state investment
whose aim is to reduce inequality in human capital. We set out the key parameters of
such a model, clarifying the assumptions that must be made by state planners or
economists in assessing the relative value of targeted investment at different ages in
the presence of a range of elements of uncertainty. We simulate the model showing
how the age-investment schedule will vary under different assumptions. Early
investment is highly valued because of the likely decline with age in effectiveness but
the trade-offs are strongly moderated by other important assumptions around which
there is uncertainty or are choice variables of the state planner.
1 Introduction
There has been considerable debate amongst economists and policy experts as to the
optimal timing of intervention in childhood to reduce adult social exclusion and
enhance equity (see, for example, Heckman, 2003; Piatt, 2003; Reynolds, Wang &
Walberg, 2003.) The consensus of much recent debate is that early is better and that
delay in the support for those most in need makes it harder to reduce attainment gaps.
In most countries, state expenditure on the early years is much below that on
secondary age or college students. It is plausible that this is an inefficient use of
public resources, whether the goal is to maximize average achievement in the
population (efficiency) or reduce the disadvantage of those whose family background
and personal circumstances leave them trailing better-off children even before they
start school (equity).
This paper does not provide new evidence on the effectiveness or otherwise of early
intervention. We accept that early intervention may be more effective than later
intervention because of key neurological moments in early development (Goswami,
2007; Whitebread, 2007) and because of impacts on young people’s motivation and
sense of their own capabilities (Bandura, 2004; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000) i.e. success
breeds success (Heckman op. cit.).
However there are important trade-offs in a system of targeted intervention between
the benefits of providing early, preventive support and the cost associated with false
identification of need. In earlier work (Feinstein, 2006), one of us analysed two UK
Birth Cohorts (the National Child Development Study and British Cohort Study)
showing that it is important to maintain a balanced perspective on risk continuity and
discontinuity. Although for many children, educational under-performance carries
long-term and profound sequelae, there is also considerable instability of risk. Many
of those at risk at one age are not at risk at subsequent ages.
It follows that any efficient system of intervention must recognise not only that an
early, preventive intervention will on the whole be more efficient than a later and
larger reactive intervention, but also that targeting should be able to recognise and
respond to changes in development and changes in risk. Against the likely greater
effectiveness of early intervention must be placed the likely greater accuracy of later
targeted intervention. In this paper, we develop a model of development and3
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intervention to estimate the implications of this trade-off for the age structure of
optimal intervention.
To do this we present a generalised theory of state intervention in the development of
children. We assume these interventions are directed at the reduction of educational
under-performance and subsequent social exclusion. We take both the educational
outcomes and the sort of intervention envisaged as given. The question is thus when
or how often rather than what.
We cast the model in terms of human capital, which makes available the insights and
techniques of the economic theory of capital. In this theory, capital is an enduring
stock of goods, typically augmented by investment. This stock is productive and
yields a return through time; the economic problem is to determine the level of
investment that generates the maximum net value of these returns. Thus we define
human capital to be any enduring human characteristic which generates a stream of
benefits to the individual possessing the characteristic (or to others). Some human
capital will be mental characteristics (mathematical ability for example), some not
(good health, physical beauty). We are interested in varieties of adult human capital
that are created or augmented by activities in childhood: we define these activities as
investment in human capital. These definitions are very broad: most or all of the
moral burden of parents in raising children can be interpreted in this format as
facilitating investment in various forms of human capital.
We focus on mental human capital. In our context, this is to be understood as
knowledge or habits of mind, interior to the individual, which influence or determine
outcomes in adulthood. Typically human capital is thought of as those mental abilities
that generate a return in the labour market. Thus the time and effort spent learning the
times-tables in childhood creates a stock of facts which reaps the return through life of
facility in arithmetical calculation, likely to be rewarded in the market-place. However
such qualities as patience (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Frederick, Lowenstein &
O’Donoghue, 2002; Fuchs, 1992) and self-regulation (Alexander, Entwisle, &
Dauber, 1993; Olson, Sameroff, Kerr, Lopez, & Wellman, 1999; Raver, Smith-
Donald, Hayes, & Jones, 2005) may well be inculcated in childhood to yield a return
outside the market-place at least as great as within it. For the purposes of the model
developed below all we need to assume is that the behaviour flowing from a specific
form and quantity of human capital can be measured and valued. An intervention is
then interpreted as effecting an investment in this form of human capital, occurring
when the natural, non-intervention rate of investment is calculated to be deficient. Just
as in the conventional theory of capital, the economic problem is to determine the
pattern of interventions that maximises the returns from changed behaviour net of the
costs of the interventions.
In the terms of our investment approach, the State is in the position of valuing a
capital asset - the child at adulthood - based on information currently available to it. If
the forecast falls below a critical level, it will be efficient for the State to intervene to
increase the rate of accumulation of human capital. If information is regularly
available and used efficiently, then each forecast will be the best possible, given the
information available. This implies that the series of forecasts evolves through time as4
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a random walk - a wandering series - as likely to rise as to fall
1. This is precisely
congruent to the behaviour of asset prices in the theory of capital markets. In our set-
up, the forecast variable is the marginal benefit of human capital at adulthood.
Intervention occurs when this exceeds the marginal cost of human capital at any given
date, with the aim of increasing human capital until its marginal benefit equals its
marginal cost. Thus the series of forecasts of marginal benefits wanders randomly in
the region beneath the time-profile of marginal costs. This profile acts as a reflecting
boundary, since the object of intervention is always to maintain the marginal benefit
of human capital no greater than its marginal cost. This describes qualitatively the
operation of an optimal system of intervention. We now fill in the details.
2 The model
We assume childhood lasts between 0  t and T t  . At T some outcome is observed.
In this paper we focus on test-scores and hence qualifications achieved as the key
outcome of education, but other dimensions of behaviour such as criminality can be
envisaged. We define human capital ) (t x at time (age) t as the expectation at t of the
outcome at T, using all information available at t. This definition is a convenient way
of making operational the notion of human capital. It would be more natural perhaps
to define human capital by indices of intellectual and psychological development, but
ultimately these would need to be mapped onto the behaviour at adulthood under
consideration.
We assume human capital evolves according to the law
(1) dt t i t t dN t dx ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (   
Here ) (t dx is the increment to human capital at time t. The variable ) (t dN is the
instantaneous revision to the expectation of adult behaviour in the absence of
intervention: this is the news that arrives at t about ) (t x . We assume
(2) ) ( ) ( ) ( t W t t N  
where ) (t W is a Weiner process. A Weiner process is composed of standard normal
increments which are independent at different dates
2. This independence property is
attractive because optimal forecasts at t of a given future event should embody all the
information available at t and only change with the arrival of new information that is
unforecastable at t. The variable ) (t  scales the Weiner process to allow the variance
of news to change over time.
The variable ) (t i is the State's expenditure on investment in the individual's human
capital at time t. We shall assume there is a maximum feasible such investment:
m i t i   ) ( 0
1 If, for example, the optimal forecast of a final outcome formed tomorrow were known to be larger
than an optimal forecast formed today, then one could improve today’s forecast by taking account of
this. Formally, this is a consequence of the so-called Law of Iterated Projections.
2 More exactly, a Weiner process is a stochastic variable in continuous time such that ) ( ) ( s W t W  is
Gaussian with variance s t  and with independent non-overlapping increments.5
Geary WP/9/2008
The variable ) (t  measures the effectiveness of intervention at t. A single extra unit of
expenditure m i i  at t will raise ultimate human capital T x T x  ) ( by ) (t  : thus ) (t  is
the marginal product of investment at time t. We define
(3) ) ( / ) (
) ( t e t
t T  
  
where  is the real interest rate (assumed constant). Then ) (t  is the marginal cost
evaluated at T t  of a unit of T x derived from expenditure on i at t. This schedule is
a given of the problem and plays a central role in its solution. Note that this marginal
cost is constant at each t while m i t i  ) ( .
We assume the State derives £-utility ) ( T x V from an end-point T x (valued at T). The












T t ds e s i x V E B
) ( ) ( ) (

at each date t by choice of a state-contingent path ) (s i . “State-contingent” means here
that ) (s i may be taken to respond to ) (s x . The maximisation is performed subject to
the law of motion given by (1).
3 The perfect foresight case
We consider first the case where the future is known with certainty i.e. there is never
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0
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
by choice of an investment plan ) (t x . The solution to this problem has the following
character, which may be proved by the Maximum Principle or by more elementary
methods. To produce at minimum cost a quantity z of (intervention) human capital the
State chooses an intervention set of the form
)} ( ]; , 0 [ { ) ( t T t       







 dt t i z m
Note that the investment level ) (t i is thus zero or the maximum m i : a bang-bang
solution. The value of  that solves (6) is the marginal cost of increasing human
capital at production level z. The relationship between z and  given by (6) is thus a
conventional marginal cost curve:
(7) ) (z MC MC 6
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Figure 1 illustrates.
Figure 1 Intervention and the marginal cost curve
The curve is the instantaneous cost curve as defined above. The ordinate  determines
the intervention set as drawn. The intervention set then determines the production
level of human capital. The value of  is chosen so that this level of production
delivers the desired z. When this is so,  is marginal cost at this level of production.
Note that when an individual enters or leaves a program of intervention, the
instantaneous marginal cost of increasing T x at this date given by ) (t  is exactly the
marginal cost of increasing T x . At points of the intervention set other than on the
boundary, overall marginal cost is greater than instantaneous marginal cost, but
production cannot be expanded here because production is at a maximum. Note also
that, while intervention is planned at 0  t , it does not begin immediately in Figure 1.
As drawn, ) (t  ranges between min  and max  ; marginal cost min  corresponds
to 0  z ; marginal cost max  corresponds to maximum output where m i i  for
all ] , 0 [ T .
The marginal cost curve partners the marginal benefit curve which has the form
(8) ) ) 0 ( ( ) ( z x V z MB x  











Figure 2 Determination of optimal level of intervention
Final level of human capital is at least ) 0 ( x . Marginal cost rises from the minimum
level of min  at A. The optimal policy is determined by MC MB  . As drawn, this
entails intervention to raise the final level of human capital to z x  ) 0 ( . If the MB
were to pass to the left of point A in the diagram, then there is zero intervention. Thus:
(9) Condition for intervention sometime min )) 0 ( (   x MB
Note that if MB passes above B then the intervention is at maximum level between 0
and T and the individual leaves the program with MB greater than MC.
If we assume that the profile does not vary across individuals then the cost-benefit
analysis is completely conditioned by the initial level of human capital. Given this, the
level of intervention and the corresponding MC are determined from Figure 2: this
MC is then exported to Figure 1 where the intervention set is determined.
4 The effect of uncertainty
We now allow news about human capital to arrive over time. We define the value
function ) , ( t x B to be the value of having human capital level x at time t. This value is
computed according to (4), assuming the (initial) level of human capital at t is x. For a
small time increment one has
(10)   dz t dt t dz x B E t x B dz t ) ( ) , ( sup ) , (       
where dz is investment in human capital and  is the news arriving over the
period ] , [ dt t t  . If the first term on the right is expanded as a Taylor series, one finds
(11) )] ( ) , ( [ ) , ( ) , ( t dt t x B E dz dt t x B E t x B x t t          
where










dt t i dz m ) (   when ) ( ) , ( t dt t x B E x t     
= 0 otherwise
Taking the limit gives the condition for intervention at t:
(12) Condition for intervention ) ( ) , ( t t x Bx  
Taking the limit in (10) yields the Bellman equation, which in our context gives two
partial differential equations forB , one when not intervening (in fact Cauchy’s Heat
equation) and a more complicated PDE when intervening. A boundary condition is
given by the requirement that B not jump at the intervention boundary. These
equations can be solved numerically for B and the intervention boundary. Our
method of solution is to divide ] , 0 [ T into a grid of subintervals and to base a
backwards recursion on (11), which expresses the value function in terms of its
expected future value and that of the derivative. The expected values can be
calculated numerically, and the recursion set going at T t  by the fact that
(13) ) ( ) , ( x V T x B 
5 Uncertainty and certainty equivalence
Uncertainty entails less intervention than the perfect-foresight case. One intuition for
this result is that the possibility of later intervention establishes a bias in favour of
non-intervention at any given time: at the margin one can correct unanticipated
deterioration in human capital to some extent in the future, but unanticipated
improvements involve a welfare loss since investment is irreversible. In the language
of finance, the option of investing at any time has a positive value that disappears
when the investment is made (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). For a slightly different
intuition, consider the value function associated with no intervention at any time,
(14) ) ( ) , (
0    x V E t x B t
where is the news that arrives after time t, so that 0   t E . Define
(15)
0 B B I  
Then I is the incremental value of the system of intervention over non-intervention.
One can think of I as the insurance value of the system: it offers protection
if ) (t x deteriorates. One expects
(16) 0  x I
since the insurance value will fall as xgrows. From (14), given some regularity, one
has ) (
0    x V E B x t x . Thus, since we take V to be quadratic, the expectation operator
may be passed inside ) (   x Vx so that
(17) ) (
0 x V B x x 9
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The condition for intervention (12) can now be written in terms of I as
(18) ) ( ) ( x V t I x x   
When it is known that no news will arrive after timet, the intervention boundary is
the locus of points ) , ( t x such that 0 ) ( ) (   x V t x  . Call this the certainty-equivalence
boundary. If ) (t  is an increasing function of time, then the CE boundary is
decreasing in time. Taking (16) and (18) together, one sees that intervention will not
occur at the CE boundary. The marginal benefit from intervention is x x V I  , which is
to be equated to : this is less than x V , since an increment to x entails loss of value in
the insurance component.
Figure 3 shows the two boundaries calculated as described above for the model we
shall take as our benchmark below. Units are chosen for human capital so that the
population mean is zero (in the absence of all intervention) and a single unit
corresponds to innovation variance at 0  t . As time advances, human capital evolves
in discrete time as a random walk from left to right in the diagram. Intervention
occurs when the random walk crosses the blue curve. The vertical difference between


























Figure 3 Intervention boundaries corresponding to uncertainty and certainty10
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6 Optimal mistakes
It is of considerable interest to know the extent of the mistakes made by optimal
policy in this model. By mistakes here we mean firstly interventions that were not
cost-effective in the sense that the value of the benefits turned out to be less than the
cost, and secondly cases where interventions would have generated net benefits but
were not made. These mistakes are mistakes only in hindsight and occur when the
child's development takes an unpredictable turn. We emphasise that these mistakes are
made under the action of an optimal policy, one that makes best use of information
available at the time when the decision was made. The extent of such mistakes can be
reduced only by improving the information available to the decision-maker. One
might call them optimal mistakes.
One has a four-way classification of interventions, according to whether the
intervention was made or not made, and whether it was cost-effective or not. See the
table.
Benefit  Cost Benefit < Cost
Intervention True positive False positive
No intervention False negative True negative
Along the diagonal, true positives and true negatives refer to policy that was cost-
effective, even with hindsight. In these cases, ex post the benefits were greater than
the costs in cases where interventions were made vice versa when they were not. False
negatives refer to cases where, at adulthood, some intervention in the past would have
been cost-effective, but was not made, and vice versa for false positives.
7 Parameterization of the model
Our aim is to simulate the model which entails specifying the benefits and costs of
intervention, as well as the stochastic structure of forecasts of outcomes..
7.1 Benefits We choose as unit of value the benefit at T from raising an individual
from x T T x x  2   to T x where T x is the population average value of T x and x  is
the population standard deviation. We set 0  T x and assume 0 ) (  T x MB i.e. the













MB is obtained by differentiating V with respect to T x .





  ) 0 ( ) (
where  is a positive constant. Thus we parameterize ) (t  by its initial value
) 0 (  and its rate of decline . The cost-structure is then completed by ascribing a
value to maximum intervention expenditure m i .
We have found an alternative parameterization to be of use. Let  be the cost of
maximum intervention from 0 to T (thus implicitly the proportion of such cost to the
value numeraire introduced above) and let  be the number of standard deviations
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For given values of  and , the cost-structure is thus determined by nomination of
either the  , pair or the m i ), 0 (  pair. The latter are the more fundamental
parameters, but the former are more interpretable and useful in determining a
benchmark model. The average cost SD c of a unit standard deviation increase in T x
from full intervention is
  /  SD c
Using the linearity of the MB schedule and the unit of value assumption from 7.1, one
can show that, under certainty, one would intervene fully throughout childhood for all
individuals with non-intervention human capital less than
) 1 2 (    SD x T c x 
Thus the system-parameter SD c is the key cost in determining the prevalence of
intervention. If 2 / 1  SD c it will be cost-effective to intervene fully for the lowest12
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2.5% of the population (with a normal distribution of T x ). Some interventions have
low SD c (presumably the proponents of free-milk in schools would argue this) and
some have high SD c (placing children in care).
7.3 Stochastic structure We have defined human capital ) (t x at time t as the
expectation of adult behaviour formed at t. Let
2
0  be the population variance of ) 0 ( x .
The innovation in the stochastic process ) (t x has variance ) (
2 t  . We shall assume
t e t
  
  ) 0 ( ) (
2 2
where  is a constant, and choose units of measurement so that . 1
2
0   Note that the







2 2 ) (    .
7.4 Summary of calibration requirements A simulation requires nomination of the
six parameters in the table below.
Cost of full intervention relative to benefit numeraire 
Number of std devns increase from full intervention 
Rate of decline of intervention effectiveness 
Real interest rate 
Initial variance of ) (t x in population 2
0 
Rate of decline of news-variance 
The parameters  and  may be replaced by ) 0 (  and m i for an alternative
parameterization.
8 Benchmark assumptions
We formulate a benchmark set of parameters, around which deviations can be studied.
The benchmark thus specifies the broad class of interventions we wish to consider in
detail. This broad class is characterized by
 full childhood-long interventions are quite rare
 full intervention will not raise a typical recipient to the population average
In line with the discussion in 7.2, we take 5 . 0   and 1   : this ensures that the
most a full intervention can do is to raise T x by one standard deviation, and that the
implicit cost is such that about 2.5% of the population would be put on a childhood-
long program from day one.
In this model whether intervention occurs early or late is determined by whether the
slope of the marginal cost curve ) (t  is positive or negative (respectively). This slope
is positive if the rate of decrease  in the effectiveness of intervention ) (t  is greater
than the real interest rate  . It is commonly argued that the effectiveness of
intervention declines rapidly as the child matures, so in the benchmark we have
chosen 1 . 0   and  = 0.03. Thus effectiveness approximately halves twice over the13
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course of childhood in the benchmark. The effect of a rising ) (t  curve is that it is
always cheaper to secure a given increase in final human capital by an intervention as
early as possible. It follows that, under a regime of optimal intervention, late
intervention occurs as a response only to an unanticipated deterioration in forecast
final human capital.
To obtain orders of magnitude for the stochastic parameters, we estimated prediction
equations for an index of academic performance at age 16 from the 1958 cohort of the
National Child Development Survey. See Table 1.
Table 1: Change in error variance of outcome prediction as children mature
Predictors of performance at age 16
Prediction at age Family type Test scores Prediction MSE
0 years Yes No 1.87
7 years Yes Yes 1.31
11 years Yes Yes 1.04
Between 0 and 7, and between 7 and 11, the prediction error declines by about 0.08
units per annum and the implied value of
2
0  (the variance of ) 0 ( x in the population)
is about 12.5 in units of the innovation variance. As a benchmark we assume that the
news variances decline at 1% per annum and that the variance ) ( 0
2
0 T x E Var   is
12.5.
9 Simulation of the benchmark
We shall study the properties of the model by simulation. A hypothetical individual at
time 0  t is given an initial human capital which is a random variable of
variance
2
0  . Subsequently the individual's human capital receives random shocks of
variance ) (
2 t  and intervention takes place according to the optimal criteria outlined
above. This path through childhood is then assessed in terms of costs and benefits.
This operation is repeated a large number of times (100,000) which enables
calculation of system characteristics such as benefit-cost ratios and participation rates.
We have simulated this model for the design:
τ γ ρ 2
0  ν
0.5 1.0 0.1 0.03 12.5 0.01
We filter out all interventions of expected duration less than one year. We obtain a
benefit-cost ratio of 1.58. At one time or another, 15.6% of the population are on a
program; the total reduction in inequality (measured as the standard deviation of final



































Just under 8% of the population are placed on a program immediately. The proportion
then declines to about 1.5% after 12 years.







































The most common time spent on a program is one year. The frequency falls steadily
with duration. About 1% of the population spend nine or more years on programs.
Accuracy of diagnosis is summarised in the table below.
Benefit ≥ Cost Benefit < Cost
Intervention 0.112 0.044
No intervention 0.111 0.733
In the true-positives cell, 11.2% of the population receive a treatment that is cost-
effective ex post, while, in the true-negatives cell, 73.3% receive no treatment when
treatment would not be cost-effective
3. Both false-positives (4.4%) and false-
negatives (11.1%) are large, indicating that misdiagnosis is very common. This may
seem paradoxical at first sight in an optimal system of intervention, but it is an
inevitable feature of a model of this sort. At time 0  t all individuals with poor
forecasts will be placed on a program. Of the others, they are not considered at-risk
for the present; subsequently the forecasts of their final level of human capital evolve
as a random walk as described above. Intervention takes place only when this random
walk crosses the reflecting boundary in Figure 3. Thus all new interventions after day
3 In our framework treatment always benefits the individual: cost-effective treatment requires the
benefits as measured by the planner.16
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one are more or less borderline cases, and misdiagnosis ex-post can be expected to be
common.
10 Sensitivity
Table 2 presents results of simulation for various values of the rate of decline of
intervention-effectiveness.
Table 2: Simulations varying the rate of decline of intervention-effectiveness
Benchmark
but with
05 . 0  
Benchmark
( 10 . 0   )
Benchmark
but with
15 . 0  
Benefit-cost ratio 1.663 1.578 1.647
Prop ever on program 0.230 0.156 0.121
Prop on day one 0.045 0.078 0.088
Prop at 18 years 0.100 0.016 0.000
Long-term treatments 0.022 0.009 0.001
False positives 0.059 0.046 0.034
Reduction in inequality 0.131 0.074 0.045
Note: In the benchmark model, σ0
2 = initial variance of x(t) in the population = 12.5;  = rate of
decline of intervention effectiveness = 0.10;  = rate of decline of news variance = 0.01;  = units
of std. dev. above average at which MB is 0 = 0  = cost of full intervention relative to benefit
numeraire = 0.5.
In the first column we assume that effectiveness declines by 5% per annum, thus
approximately halving over the course of childhood. This results in a scheme of larger
scope than the benchmark (23% of the population are on a program at one time or
another compared to 15.6% under the benchmark). Note that intervention tends to
occur late rather than early, in contrast to the benchmark. In a world of certainty,
intervention occurs early or late according as the rate of decline of effectiveness is
greater than or less than the real interest rate. With 05 . 0   , the rate of decline is
greater than 03 . 0   , but the presence of uncertainty provides another reason to
intervene late which turns out to be stronger than the effect of the real interest rate.
This example shows the early/late question depends crucially on the cost technology
of intervention.
In the third column we increase the rate of decline of intervention-effectiveness from
0.15, so that effectiveness at the end of childhood is approximately one eighth of its
initial value. This essentially wipes out later intervention: there are no treatments at
age 18 and only 0.1% of the population receive long-term treatments.
Note that the proportion of the population on a program at day one increases with the
rate of decline of intervention effectiveness (row three). On day one the effectiveness
of intervention is the same in all three columns (because ) 0 (  is the same). When later
intervention is costly, however, the planner has an added precautionary incentive to
intervene early, in case human capital unexpectedly deteriorates.
In Table 3 we present simulations for different values of the initial variance of human
capital, holding everything else as in the benchmark. Naturally one expects the higher
the variance of initial human capital, the higher the level of intervention at all ages,17
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and the greater the reduction in inequality. This is borne out: all measures of
intervention increase monotonically with
2
0  , as does the reduction in inequality.
Intervention is early rather than late in the last three columns, but for 4
2
0   one finds
that late intervention is more prevalent. The logic behind this is that if the variance of
initial human capital is small, so that one has little information about children’s
prospects, then the best forecast of adult behaviour is average adult behaviour, which
does not warrant intervention. With the passage of time, some children will
experience falls in observed human capital and be subject to intervention. Thus
intervention will increase over time. If, however, the rate of decline in intervention-
effectiveness is high enough, late intervention will be low. In these circumstances the
path of average intervention levels will not be monotonic: intervention will be low
both for young children and old children, with a maximum intervention level
somewhere in between. In the model in the first column of Table 3, intervention is at
its maximum seven years after commencement i.e. halfway through childhood.


















Benefit-cost ratio 1.383 1.521 1.578 1.638
Prop ever on program 0.064 0.134 0.156 0.179
Prop on day one 0.007 0.057 0.078 0.100
Prop at 18 years 0.009 0.013 0.016 0.019
Long-term treatments 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.013
False positives 0.020 0.041 0.046 0.050
Reduction in inequality 0.027 0.062 0.074 0.085
Table 4 presents results for different values of the cost of full intervention relative to
the benefit numeraire: one sees that the general prevalence of intervention depends
very strongly on the cost of intervention. With intervention 20% less costly than in the
benchmark, over one in five of the population participates in programs, whereas, with
intervention 20% more costly than the benchmark, the proportion falls to about one in
ten.









Benefit-cost ratio 1.731 1.578 1.490
Prop ever on program 0.218 0.156 0.110
Prop on day one 0.105 0.078 0.058
Prop at 18 years 0.035 0.016 0.006
Long-term treatments 0.019 0.009 0.004
False positives 0.063 0.046 0.032
Reduction in inequality 0.104 0.074 0.05118
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In Table 5 we give simulations for different effectiveness levels (quantity measure) of
intervention. Proportional increases in the effectiveness of intervention have similar
but not equivalent effects to corresponding reductions in costs in Table 4. In both
cases there is no indication that early intervention would be overturned by plausible
variation in these parameters.











Benefit-cost ratio 1.462 1.578 1.707
Prop ever on program 0.106 0.156 0.202
Prop on day one 0.058 0.078 0.092
Prop at 18 years 0.007 0.016 0.027
Long-term treatments 0.005 0.009 0.012
False positives 0.032 0.046 0.056
Reduction in inequality 0.043 0.074 0.105
Table 6 reports simulations varying the real interest rate and the rate of decline in
innovation-variance.




06 . 0  
Benchmark
but with
1 . 0  
Benefit-cost ratio 1.428 1.609
Prop ever on program 0.095 0.145
Prop on day one 0.029 0.084
Prop at 18 years 0.023 0.005
Long-term treatments 0.006 0.007
False positives 0.026 0.035
Reduction in inequality 0.047 0.082
High real interest rates are favourable to later expenditures and this is reflected in the
first column where we see late interventions are almost as large as early interventions.
In the second column we allow innovations to human capital to become smaller with
the passage of time, thus enabling more accurate forecasts of adult outcomes.
Compared with the benchmark, the benefit-cost ratio is higher, for a somewhat
smaller program size. The accuracy-of-diagnosis matrix is:
Benefit ≥ Cost Benefit < Cost
Intervention 0.111 0.035
No intervention 0.096 0.757
This matrix should be compared to the analogous matrix in Section 9. One sees that
the off-diagonal entries are smaller, reflecting fewer errors in assignments to19
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programs, both of those who shouldn’t have been on a program but were, and who
should have been but weren’t. This is a return to more accurate forecasts.
11 Extensions
One of the main concerns of practitioners is the negative effect on individuals from
being placed in an intervention category, sometimes called stigma-effect (see e.g.
Foster et al., 1972; Horowitz & Garber, 2001; Perlick et al., 1991) When such effects
are important, there will be fewer interventions. Problems of measurement aside, it is
straightforward to incorporate this in our framework. Figure 4 is a variant of Figure 2
in which the initial level of human capital ) 0 ( x at point A is chosen so that the area
between the MC and MB curves is exactly the stigma cost. Since this area is the total
non-stigma benefit from an intervention, interventions are efficient only for initial
levels of human capital to the left of A. In contrast, without stigma effects, some
intervention would occur for all initial levels of human capital to the left of point B.
Figure 4 Reduced interventions with stigma costs
Another extension of the framework would address the relative trade-offs between
offering effective help at the lowest end of the human capital distribution and at low
but less extreme points. Some argue that current policy effectively abandons the
lowest achieving tranche of children and concentrates on helping the next tranche
(Gillborn & Youdell, 2000). In the model as developed above, the law of motion
assumes that a given quantity of investment raises human capital by a given amount,
irrespective of the initial level. A plausible alternative in line with Heckman’s notion
of complementarities between learning gained at one point in time and later learning
would be that a given level of investment would raise human capital by a given
proportional amount. In this case, the law of motion would be
dt t i t t dN x t dx ) ( ) ( ) ( / ) (   









) 0 ( x20
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x t MC / ) (  
where ) (t  is the original marginal cost function.
4 The MC = MB region of
) , ( t x space is shown in Figure 5. There are two intervention boundaries, an upper and
a lower, and intervention occurs only within the convex region enclosed by them. If
the decline in intervention-effectiveness ) (t  is modest then at the end of childhood at
point A there will still be some individuals for whom intervention is appropriate. If
however the decline in intervention-effectiveness is sufficiently great, then all
intervention will cease before childhood ends, in this case represented by point B.
Despite the fact that the benefits of raising the human capital of those below the lower
intervention boundary might be very large, the costs of doing so are even greater than
the benefits.
Figure 5 Intervention boundaries when the marginal product of intervention
depends on human capital
It follows that the qualitative character of a system of intervention depends crucially
on the relationship between the effectiveness of intervention and existing levels of
human capital. Very little is known about this relationship. It is also possible that the
rate of return on investments in human capital will be highest for those with the
lowest current levels as many of these individuals may have received low levels of
private (family) investment and so may benefit from high returns to investment in line
with the law of diminishing returns.
12 Summary and conclusions
We have developed a general model of optimal state-intervention in childhood that
takes account of the presence of uncertainty in forecasts of adult outcomes, as well
changes in the effectiveness of intervention at different ages. The model requires
parameters to describe:









 The preferences of the state planner
 The cost-structure and effectiveness of intervention
 The stochastic structure of forecasts of adult outcomes
Preferences of the planner. A £-value needs to be placed on increased human
capital. We have chosen as numeraire the value of raising human capital from two
standard deviations below the mean to the mean.
Cost-structure and effectiveness of intervention. The model requires nomination of
the cost of full (childhood-long) intervention relative to the benefit numeraire. This
quantity is thus the £-cost of full intervention divided by the £-value of raising an
individual by two standard deviations to the mean. In our benchmark model we have
chosen this parameter to be 0.5, which implies that intervention to so raise the human
capital of an individual at the bottom of the distribution would be well worth the cost,
if it were possible. A second required parameter is the number of standard deviations
of increase in human capital that full intervention can achieve. We have chosen this to
be unity. These two assumptions characterize the benchmark as a system where full
intervention throughout childhood occurs but is rare, and where raising one of these
full-intervention children to the mean typically does not occur. A third required
parameter is the rate of decline of intervention effectiveness. The qualitative nature of
the program of intervention depends heavily on this parameter. We have chosen it in
the benchmark model to be 0.1 (compared to a real interest rate of 0.03). This implies
that intervention at the end of childhood is about a quarter as effective as it was at the
beginning.
Stochastic structure of forecasts of adult outcomes. The model requires both the
population variance of the day-one forecasts of adult outcomes and the year-on-year
decline of the error variance of forecasts. Examination of forecast equations from the
1958 NCDS cohort suggested that the variance of the year-on-year forecasts declined
by about the same amount each year, and that the initial variance was about 12.5 that
number. We chose these magnitudes for our benchmark model, but we allowed the
year-on-year forecast errors to decline by a token 1% per annum.
For this specification of parameter values, we find that quite an activist policy of
intervention is optimal. About 8% of children are placed on a program immediately at
five years. Participation in programs declines steadily to about 1.5% by age 17. The
most common duration of program is one year, for about 4.5% of the population.
About 1% of the population spend nine or more years on programs. Misdiagnosis ex-
post is quite common, despite the optimality of the procedure. About 11.1% of the
population experience no intervention when this would have been cost-effective ex-
post, while 4.4% experience intervention that is not cost-effective ex-post.
Sensitivity We have subjected all our parametric assumptions to sensitivity analysis.
Changes in the parameters will in general change the predictions of the model.
Intervention effectiveness and the cost of intervention act similarly but in opposite
directions to determine the general scope of intervention as seen in Tables 4 and 5. If
the rate of decline of intervention-effectiveness is increased substantially from our
benchmark of 10% then late-intervention is effectively eliminated. For moderate rates
of decline, however, late intervention can be more prevalent than early intervention.
Similarly, high real interest rates can favour late intervention. We have found as well22
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that, if the initial variance of human capital in the population is low, so that early
forecasts of adult outcomes tend to be poor, then it can happen that the prevalence of
optimal intervention will rise over time, only to fall towards the end of childhood.
Early versus late A major aim was to cast some light on the early versus late
intervention debate. We have formulated a benchmark model to have the properties
that full intervention is fairly rare, only of limited effectiveness, and declines in
effectiveness over the course of childhood to about one quarter of its value at the
beginning. For a stochastic structure parallel to the information in NCDS data, we
have found that intervention is unambiguously early rather than late. However there
are models not too far distant in parameter space where this is reversed. Perhaps the
most critical is the rate of decline of intervention-effectiveness. If this is 5% per
annum rather than 10% per annum, then intervention is late rather than early.
Informational requirements Policy-makers contemplating a program of intervention
need to consider the three sets of parameters indicated above. In particular, they need
to quantify:
 The social benefits of moving an individual out of the lower tail of the human
capital distribution.
 The costs and effectiveness of intervention. Costs are easy, but effectiveness is
harder. One needs to know the age-profile of intervention-effectiveness. One
needs to know the effectiveness of intervention for those with very low human
capital.
 The accuracy of forecasts of adult outcomes. If the only available forecasts are
weak predictors of adult outcomes then the scope for policy is reduced. We
have found that forecasts based on the NCDS are sufficiently accurate to
support a fairly activist policy of intervention in education, but this may not be
so in other contexts.23
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